what it is." "A container of some sort?" "Yes," I said, "and what would it contain?" "It would contain its contents!" said Dr. P., with a laugh.' Dr. P is a patient suffering from a neurological condition termed Visual Agnosia by Oliver Sacks in his book. The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat. What is interesting in the case of Dr. R, an active and widely known musician, is that his visual agnosia is described as an inability to recognizeand therefore to identify and namespecific objects of the visual world, while he is able to recognize geometric shapes and refer to what is seen, as in the case of the glove, in terms of abstract spatial or conceptual categories. What could we expect from the same patient, suffering from visual agnosia, if, instead of the glove. Dr. Sacks had requested a description of the modern house across the street? Not being able to recognize and name the house, we could expect the patient to refer to abstract concepts and geometric shapes and answer, "I see a white volume formed by flat rectangle surfaces." This description of the house, which selectively propounds certain geometrical characteristics of the house-object, would seem familiar and self-evident, yet it is determined by a specific historical perspective. It would be much easier to describe a modern structure designed by Mies van der Rohe or Rietveld based on its geometric characteristics than a farmhouse in the Black Forest or the continuous housing facades along the Amsterdam canals. For the description of a farmhouse, the use of elements such as roof, door, windows, and the use of terms for materials such as slates or shingles would be much more appropriate. On the contrary, a house by Rietveld could more easily be described by means of abstract concepts such as rectangle surfaces, voids, solids, basic colors, etc.
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Perhaps we should not subject Dr. Sacks's patient to any further hypothetical and arbitrary tests, since it is apparent that, based on his mental attains the condition of "visual agnosia" of a denuded metaphysical dimension.
In a similar vein, consider the protagonist of a 1911 Viennese cartoon. With the Looshaus at IVlichaelerplatz in mind, a passerby, suddenly standing in front of an open sewer, draws a "funny" analogy between its shape and that of Loos's building (Fig. 3 ). This analogy reveals the period's anti-Modernist morals. It is of further interest to note that the cartoonist, while faithfully transcribing the building's windows on the sewer cover, is not exact in his representation of the building itself; he has eliminated the Doric columns flanking the entrance, the facade's main decorative feature. This removal of the building's decorative elements forces the rhetoric of the denuded wall to a more radical form of non-identification that allows its transcription from one checkered, gridlike surface to another grid-like surface, while the cartoon's contextual meaning transforms it into a completely different object. "The most modern man," according to the cartoon's caption, confronted by the sewer, recognizes at last "that for which he has searched so long." The underlying assumption presupposes the unidentifiable nature of the Modernist form.
Since the time Loos's centrally located building shocked the Viennese aristocracy, many things have changed, and the city's modern buildings have become familiar landmarks of this historic capital. However, the fundamental material essence of the forms, transformed by Modernism into geometric shapes or abstract patterns, has not changed. Therefore, if this insistence on the correlation of the term "visual agnosia" with Modernism's geometric forms is to be of any interest, it must not be limited to the description of the shock its novel appearance caused in its time but, conversely, extended to the generalization of the concept of unidentifiability beyond Modernist forms. What would really happen if the aesthetic relationship between a contemporary modern wall and an ancient Egyptian wallas eloquently exemplified by Ciedionled us to the conclusion that these two distant civilizations both showed the same neurological symptoms of visual agnosia?
The actual criticism of Modernism is an inseparable part of Modernism itself. When, for example, we speak of the relationship between the specific and the abstract, the descriptive and the geometric, the evident and the implied, we formalize the debate arising from the phenomenological criticism of Modernism in the 1 970s and 1 980s. During that time, Alberto Perez Gomez reintroduced the juxtaposition between the lebenswelt and the abstract world of geometry, while Christian Norberg-Schulz followed suit and, borrowing from Heidegger, compared the concept of the thing to the crisis of meaning of the modern object. Since its criticism is part of Modernism, we could hypothesize that the pathology of criticism is also part of modern pathology. However, in this context, we must avoid the tendency to link the visual agnosia argument with a hypothetical phenomenological criticism on Modernism. A neuro-pathological equivalent of the "phenomenological" extolling of the representational form could easily be found.^K Sacks's book, which starts with Dr. P.'s case of visual agnosia, ends with the following story: little Jose, an autistic child with drastically reduced cognitive and emotional interaction with the surrounding world, develops a particular ability to reproduce specific images from a National Geographic style magazine provided by the doctor (Fig. 4) . In this case, the doctor diagnosestogether with a remarkable ability to reproduce specific forms such as a fish or a canoethe complete inability to comprehend the world in which these forms exist, as well as the incapability to grasp abstract concepts. For little Jose, a large part of reality beyond the specificity of the given image falls under the category of the essentially invisible. Should we then ironically consider this autistic entrenchment in the specific, this consoling glimmer from inside the isolated autistic "island world"^as the opposing pole to the visual agnosia of the professor, who can interact with the visible world only by referring to abstract concepts or by relating it to his pure "inner music"6? Should we, even in jest, add to the criticism on Modernism as "visual agnosia" a further criticism on its adherence to the representational? Furthermore, having taken this construct into the realm of the ridiculous, could we then return to a time of ideological peace and reexamine the relationship between art and pathology, aesthetics and neurology, only this time from an anthropological perspective?
Obviously not wholly rid of the romantic notion that identifies the artistic with the pathological. Dr. Sacks tells us that "there is often a struggle and sometimes a collusion between the powers of pathology and creation. "' By taking Dr. P.'s case from the realm of neuropathology and transferring his disorder, visual agnosia, into the realm of aesthetics, we commit an arbitrary act, even though we nod expectantly from the side of aesthetics toward the side of neurology. We are not alone, however, in this arbitrary gathering. Dr. Sacks nods from the opposite side toward aesthetics. Having arrived at the patient's house, his wife shows Sacks the musician's paintings, dating from his youth to the recent past.
As he examines them in chronological order, he notes, "All his earlier work was naturalistic and realistic, with vivid mood and atmosphere, but finely detailed and concrete. Then, years later, they became less vivid, less concrete, less realistic and naturalistic but far more abstract. What kind of judgment is this that allows the neurologist to make decisions regarding the most creative moment in the artistic journey of a painter, even an amateur one? What would prohibit another doctor, possibly at an earlier time, to articulate exactly the same judgment regarding the artistic development of painters such as Kandinsky or Mondrian?
It is not impossible that the doctor, although unconsciously, sees in his patient the artistic course of a painter such as Mondrian, 9 who, throughout his life, strove to develop his famous trees and seascapes into the purely abstract compositions of his later creative period (Fig. 5 ). If the doctor's judgment of the patient's art is primarily an aesthetic one, would it then follow that the medical opinion deeming "visual agnosia" a neurological disorder is at the same time an aesthetic judgment?
We could attempt to look at neurology's undertaking from an aesthetic point of view. Applying this reversal mechanically, we ascribe a pathological content to aesthetic phenomena, especially during their modern manifestation. We project onto the general convention of modernity the condition of visual agnosia, which has stricken Dr. Sacks's patient due to the fateful development of an ocular tumor. It is not only the disorder's tendency toward abstraction that matches modern art's conventions.
Other manifestations of this generalized visual agnosia, such as the distortion of the human face typical of expressionism'" or the surrealist 'o ibid., p. 12 transposition of names and objects, can be found in Dr. P's pathology.
The patient, as if fulfilling a distant prophecy by Rene Magritte, takes his wife's head for his own hat. How is it then possible for the patient's symptoms, expressionism, surrealism, and visual abstraction to converge on formulating modern visual perception? 39 9 We can think of the artistic biography of Mondrian as a metaphor "from" the picture of things (the tree, the sea) "to" a pure, nonfigurative geometric form.
Suddenly, trusting the description of an isolated neurological disorder of visual agnosia, we tend to reach conclusions regarding the general con-thresholds 19 dition of art in our century. This undertaking may not be futile, even though we realize that this metaphor between pathology and art is completely arbitrary. Liberating aesthetic judgment from the strict confines imposed by the discipline of aesthetics and allowing it to wander freely in the vast territory of anthropological studies, it might return to its original discipline (of aesthetics), bearing an unexpected hypothesis for further inquiry. The culturally constant, modern way of seeing holistically belongs to a dark and obscure realm that could well be named visual agnosia.
To this point, we have apparently considered the real question of our hypothesis as given. However, what significance do we finally attach to the term visual agnosia? The word "agnosia" is Creek and is comprised '*°o f the word "gnosis" (yvcuois), meaning "knowledge," preceded by the privative "a." Therefore, "agnosia" signifies the inability to gain knowledge. As a conceptual formulation, "visual agnosia" embodies an innate paradox, and it is surely this paradox that highlights the pathological condition described by this medical term; namely, the description of a blindness caused not by an ocular malfunction but rather by a mental one. Nevertheless, what is it that allows us to separate the eye from the mind or sight from intellect in order to apply a paradoxical as well as poetic term such as visual agnosia?
In ancient Creek, the word for "idea" (i&eu) and the verb "to know" (oi6a) have the same root as the verb "to see" (opcu) . The act of seeing, therefore, is deeply rooted in and inevitably associated with the concept of knowledge, as much as knowledge is in turn innately lit by the totality of seeing. The platonic idea (i6fa) and the Aristotelian species (fi6os) incorporate the memory of this relationship between the visible cosmos (koohos) and the knowledge thereof. Reconsidering the previously mentioned fundamental affinity of seeing and knowing, we return to the term "visual agnosia." Even if we had to generalize this term, as in the preceding text where it was arbitrarily applied to define the condition of the modern world, this generalization would hardly denote that the modern world is pathological in its entirety. It would simply connote that, through art, the modern world has experienced the consequences of a linguistic transformation; sight is no longer conceived of as innately related to understanding and knowledge. The relationship between sight and knowledge is constantly and continuously redefined. Consequently, modern art can be interpreted as an ongoing pursuit to observe the world in terms of the radical incompatibility between visible phenomena and knowledge thereof. This divide between the truth of appearances as a condition of seeing and the truth of appearances as a condition of knowing could indeed lead to a redefinition of visual agnosia, well beyond the medical terminology of brain specialists. More specifically, we could consider as visual agnosia the dynamic pursuit in a ruinous landscape of a historically concluded momentous separation; the separation of vision from knowledge and the consequent ongoing quest for their coexistence, however fleeting, in works of modern art. *This essay was originally written in Creek; English translation by A. Macheras.
